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The Editor will gratefully receive contributions, in English or Tamil, of articles on matters of *National War Front interest*, and publish them, if suitable, as signed articles, in the Bulletin. The articles should be short and reach the Editor a week in advance.

LECTURE CXCII.

NEITHER ASSAM NOR INDIA IN DANGER.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S CONFIDENT REVIEW.

The Burma Front offers to the Japanese two main lines of approach; one in the south from the Arakan towards Chittagong and the province of Bengal, and the other in the north, through very mountainous country towards Manipur and Assam.

I have already described the failure of the Japanese effort in the Arakan. Our troops are still on the offensive in this sector, and in the face of stubborn and sometimes suicidal resistance, they are gradually forcing the enemy back from the strategically important lateral road which connects Maungdaw with Buthidaung.

The Japanese are fighting very hard to retain their hold on this vital link, but as I said they are steadily losing ground, and suffering very heavily in the process. That is the situation on the southern front in the Arakan, and it is in my opinion satisfactory.

IN MANIPUR AREA.

On the second line of approach in the north, the enemy is endeavouring to penetrate the formidable physical barrier of mountain and jungle which stretches over 200 miles or so, from the Chin Hills to the south of Imphal to the Somra hill tracts to the east and north-east of Imphal.

In this area, our main line of supply by a road from Manipur, through Kohima to Imphal, runs parallel to the main battle front. This is a strategical disadvantage, but it is dictated by the lie of the country, as the hills in this part of the world run north

and south, and the valleys between them offer the only possible means for movement of troops and stores on a large scale.

It is this fact which makes this line of communication vulnerable to attack by enemy raiding parties, which may be able to penetrate along the various trail and footpaths through the mountains, which are passable to men on foot. There are many of these trails and paths, and to attempt to defend them all would only serve to dissipate our strength and make us weak everywhere.

ENEMY'S MAIN ADVANCE.

The enemy's main advance is taking place against this line of communication, from Manipur in the north to Tiddim and Tamu, both of which are in Burma, in the south, and it is in this area that the most important operations are now taking place.

The enemy is fighting for a quick decision. He has no well organised line of communication immediately behind him, and in Central Burma his rear is threatened by our forces which, as Hon. members are aware, have been landed from the air.

These forces, by destroying railways, interrupting enemy movement by river and generally attacking the enemy's supply organisation, are now beginning to make their presence felt.

The area itself is a very extensive one, as compared with the area in which fighting is taking place in Italy. As they expand their operations, it is to be hoped that the enemy, who is thrusting forward towards Manipur, will find himself short of supplies, and be compelled to detach troops to remove the threat to his rear.

The full pressure of our forces, which are operating inside Burma behind the enemy's lines, cannot, of course, be felt immediately, but the effect of it is likely to be steady and cumulative and it is likely to grow.

The enemy's lines of communication and forward bases are also threatened by the southward advance of the Chinese and American troops under Gen. Stilwell, who are operating in the Hukawng Valley.

HEAVY ENEMY LOSSES.

These forces have had considerable success, and here, again, as in the extreme south, very heavy losses have been inflicted on the Japanese, who have been forced to withdraw for a considerable distance and are still withdrawing.

Apart from all this pressure on the enemy, our air forces are hammering steadily at the enemy's communications—they are striking at his railways, his riverways, his depóts, and, in fact, at the whole of the great organisation which is necessary to keep his armies in the field.

The weight and frequency of our air attacks is steadily increasing, and we have ample evidence of the delay and loss they are causing the enemy.

Prior to the enemy's crossing of the Chindwin, and his subsequent advance towards Imphal and Manipur, our own forces were operating in the Tiddim and Tamu areas—these places may be familiar to members who have studied the maps—and we had constructed good roads connecting both these places with our advanced base at Imphal or rather, the Imphal plain.

ENEMY'S OBJECTIVE.

The enemy's object appears to be to establish himself before the monsoon in the Imphal-Kohima area, and then to attempt to strike at our rail and river communications

from Calcutta, along the Brahmaputra, into north-eastern Assam. In order to effect this object the enemy developed his offensive as follows:—

First, he made a threat against Imphal from the south, and, secondly, he advanced on Imphal from the east and north-east. In the south, that is, in the Tiddim area, in the Chin Hills, the enemy's intention was apparently confined to getting behind our forward troops, and establishing blocks across the road on which they depended for their supplies. That is a favourite manoeuvre; he tried it in the Arakan with disastrous results to himself.

It does not appear, at any rate for the present, that he has any intention of trying to attack Imphal from this direction, that is, from the south.

Tiddim is of no particular strategic value to us, and we did not attempt to hold it. In accordance with the correct principles of war, our commanders decided that their proper objective was the enemy force, which was trying to hem them in from the north by blocking the roads behind.

JAPS HEMMED IN.

Our troops in the Tiddim area, therefore, moved northwards, and have been steadily attacking and pushing back the enemy for some time past. They have been helped in this by troops which moved down from the north from the direction of Imphal itself, thus subjecting the enemy to pressure from both sides, from the north and from the south.

These operations have been largely successful, and the two forces have now joined hands and heavy casualties have been inflicted on the enemy in the process. These are still small parties of the enemy on the road between Tiddim and Imphal, but it looks as if it should not take long to remove them. That is the situation immediately south of Imphal.

In the Tamu area itself, the enemy has made little progress, and has not succeeded in interrupting traffic on the road between Tamu and Imphal, that is the second road which we have been building for many months past. Here again he has made several fruitless attacks and has again suffered casualties.

IMPHAL STILL IN OUR HANDS.

I would like here to make it quite clear that Imphal is still in our hands, that it has not been captured by the Japanese and that it is strongly defended.

It is always possible that small parties of the enemy may penetrate into the Imphal plain, because this is made easy by the nature of the surrounding country, the intricacy of which has to be seen to be believed. Such penetration, however, is not likely to be of major importance.

The opinion expressed in an American paper that the fall of Imphal would be of little importance is erroneous. Our commanders do not intend that Imphal should fall into the enemy's hands.

In conjunction with this advance in the direction of Imphal, the enemy has made two further thrusts towards the northern part of the road from Imphal to the Manipur road, which is our main railhead in this part of the world.

Both these thrusts are more or less in the direction of Kohima. Here the enemy has made some progress, but it is only within the last day or two that he has come up against our prepared defences and met with serious opposition on our part. This is in accordance with our pre-arranged plans.

The country in this part of the world, that is, to the north of Kohima, is extremely mountainous and intricate, and the only transport which can be used are pack animals or porters.

Kohima is held by our forces and strongly defended.

AIR SUPERIORITY.

Throughout these operations, we have continued to maintain marked air superiority over the enemy, and two days ago inflicted a very heavy defeat on him in the air, destroying no less than 30 of his aircraft. When the size of the total enemy air forces in Burma is taken into consideration, this constitutes a heavy loss to him.

As I have already said, in the Hukwang Valley, Gen. Stilwell's American and Chinese troops, assisted by British and Indian troops, are maintaining their advance, and threatening the enemy who is covering Myitkyina.

In operations of this kind, and especially in a country of this nature, there must be at the outset thrusts by the enemy which cannot be finally countered until our commanders have ascertained his plan and disposed their own forces accordingly.

Such thrusts rely on quick results for success. We have now reached the stage where the enemy's plan would seem to be sufficiently clear to enable our troops to be suitably disposed not only to protect our own vital points but also to drive back the enemy whence he came.

These troops of ours are well acquainted with its most intricate country and have been intensively trained to fight in it. Their morale and fighting spirit are of the highest

CONFIDENCE IN VICTORY.

I repeat once more that I have no doubt myself as to the ultimate result of the fighting now in progress. We cannot stop every Japanese thrust as soon as it makes itself apparent and it is, therefore, always possible that some of these may succeed in, temporarily, interrupting our communications. That is a fact which we have to accept temporarily.

I am convinced, however, that the security of Assam has never been in danger, let alone the security of India. I feel certain that we shall maintain our forward line of communication and ultimately drive the enemy back to his original position and beyond.

WEEKLY WAR SUMMARY.

(A)—LEADING EVENTS.

27—3—44 (Monday). **Russians occupy** *KAMENETS—PODOLSKI* **on the** *UPPER DNIESTER.*

Allies occupy *AMO* **and** *NOROVA* **Islands in the** *ADMIRALTY* **Group.**

28—3—44 (Tuesday).	Russians capture *NIKOLAYEV*, Black Sea port.
	Chinese capture *HKAWN-GLAWYANG* in northern *BURMA*.
29—3—44 (Wednesday).	Russians cross River *PRUTH*.
	Allies withdraw from 2 positions in the *CASSINO* area in *ITALY*.
30—3—44 (Thursday).	Russians capture *CERNAUTI*, the capital of *BUKOVINA*.
	Mr. Churchill obtains vote of confidence from Commons by an overwhelming majority of 425 to 23.
31—3—44 (Friday).	Russians capture *OCHAKOV*, on the Black Sea coast.
	U. S. Fleet attacks *PALAU* Island in the Japanese inner Fortress chain.
	Allies occupy *PITYALU* in the *ADMIRALTY* Group.
	JAPAN agrees to transfer oil and coal concessions in North *SAKHALIN* to *RUSSIA*.
2—4—44 (Sunday).	Red Army moves into *RUMANIA*.
3—4—44 (Monday).	*RUSSIANS* cut *JASSY—DOROHOI* Railway.
	Allies bomb *BUDAPEST*, the capital of *HUNGARY*.
	Allies occupy 11 more Atolls in the *MARSHALLS* Group.

(B) NEWS IN BRIEF.

Russia.—Having forced the Pruth, ZHUKOV is now at the Carpathian Passes from which two lines of advance are open—one, down the Serret Corridor into RUMANIA and the Danubian plains, and the other, through the Carpathian gaps into CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The battle of the Carpathians has been joined. Russian troops have entered Rumanian territory.

The battle for ODESSA has also begun. Three Russian columns are now moving on this important Black Sea port from north, north-east, and east. To the north-west, Von Kleist, the General in Command of the split southern half of General Manstein's army, is fighting a desperate delaying action, in a bid to hold open an escape corridor for the ODESSA garrison and the remnants of German forces still east of the Dniester.

Inside POLAND, TARNOPOL, the last important German bastion on the ODESSA-LWOW railway has fallen.

Italy.—The Allies have gone back to the defensive in the CASSINO sector. The Germans have reoccupied the eastern slopes of Monastery Hill and Hangman's hill, but the Allies have taken MT. MARRONE.

Air War.—The Chief targets were BRUNSWICK, NUREMBERG, HANOVER, and STEYR (Vienna). In the attack on NUREMBERG, the Allied loss was 94 out of 1,000 planes—the greatest the R. A. F. have sustained in a single operation. It shows the intensity of the air fight. For the first time the lurking *Luftwaffe* rose to a deliberate challenge, and lost much more heavily than the invaders.

Burma.—The Japanese aim is to infiltrate towards IMPHAL, the capital of MANIPUR State by different routes. On Thursday, descending from the Naga hills, they cut the IMPHAL—KOHIMA road, 30 miles north of IMPHAL. The Japanese concentration in the UKHRAL area, north of IMPHAL is thinning out, while in the Naga Hills area it is increasing. They are also trying to advance by the TAMU Road.

The Chinese advance from SHADUZUP towards LABAN in the MOGAUNG valley is being kept up. Allied Air-borne Commandos have occupied a strip of 12 miles of the MANDALAY—MYITKYINA railroad and the high way to KATHA.

The Jap activity in the Bay of Bengal is increasing.

The Pacific.—PALAU Islands, 1,300 miles west of TRUK and 700 miles from the PHILIPPINES were bombarded.

PAKIN Island in the CAROLINES was bombed. PITYALU Island in the ADMIRALTY Group was occupied.

ALLIED AIR RAIDS.

25—3—44 (Saturday).

EUROPE (German occupied).
(1 Allied plane missing).

NIGHT :—
Railway targets at AULNOYE (France).
Objectives in the LYONS area, BERLIN and other places in Western GERMANY.

ITALY.
(1 Allied plane missing).
The docks at LEGHORN.
The rail bridge at RIGNANO.
Gun positions in the CASSINO area.

RUSSIA.
(18 enemy planes shot down).
Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN Front.

FAR EAST.
A Jap cargo ship at WEWAK (N. Guinea).
Installations at DAGUA and KAIRIRU Islands.
PONAPE (Carolines).
Jap-held Atolls in the MARSHALLS.

BURMA.
Supply dumps at PROME and MAUNGDAW.
Targets in the areas of the CHIN Hills, NAGA Hills, the CHINDWIN and KABAW Valleys.

26—3—44. (Sunday).

EUROPE (German occupied).
DAY :—(6 Allied planes missing).
Military installations in the PAS DE CALAIS and CHERBOURG areas.
Port facilities at IJMUIDEN (Holland).
Rail targets in Northern FRANCE.
The airfields near PARIS.
NIGHT :—(9 Allied planes missing)
The KRUPPS works at ESSEN (Germany).
Targets at HANOVER (Germany) and COURTRAI (Belgium).
Laying mines in enemy waters.

ITALY.
Communications and enemy positions in the CASSINO and ANZIO areas.

RUSSIA.
(18 enemy planes shot down).
Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN Front.

FAR EAST.
The harbour and coastal vessels at WEWAK (New Guinea).
Shipping and harbour installations at HAINAN (South China).

BURMA.
Troop concentrations and other objectives on the TIDDIM-IMPHAL Road.
Enemy positions and communications in the ARAKAN, MAYU and KALADAN areas.
Objectives in the CHIN Hills and CHINDWIN Valley.
Bridges at HPAUNGZEIK and the MANIPUR River.

27—3—44 (Monday).

EUROPE (German occupied).
DAY :—(38 enemy planes shot down; 21 Allied planes missing).
The airfields in the S. W. and Central FRANCE.
Military objectives in the PAS DE CALAIS area and Northern FRANCE.
NIGHT :—
Objectives in the RUHR (Western GERMANY).

ITALY.
(2 enemy planes shot down; 3 Allied planes missing).
Railway bridges at POGGIBONSI, MARSCIANNO and SETTE BAGNI.
Airfields at RIMINI and FORLI.
Enemy shipping off the DALMATIAN coast and off the W. coast of ITALY.
Patrolling over the battle areas.

RUSSIA.
Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN Front.

FAR EAST.
Jap-held Atolls in the MARSHALLS.
Airfields at RABAUL ((N. Britain) and WEWAK (N. Guinea).

BURMA.
(3 Allied planes missing).
Air combats over Northern BURMA (27 enemy planes shot down).
Rail targets at KAWLIN.
Dump areas at KAMAING.
Enemy positions and communications in the ARAKAN, KALADAN and MAYU areas.
Troops, enemy positions, camps and communications in the CHIN Hills, CHINDWIN Valley, and N. W. BURMA.
Oil dumps in central BURMA.

28—3—44 (Tuesday).

EUROPE (German occupied).
DAY :—(30 Axis planes shot down and 20 more damaged; 5 Allied planes missing).
Training bases at CHARTRES and DIJON.

Operational base at CHATEAUDUN (France).
The airfield at CHAMPAGNE.

Night :—
Laying mines in enemy waters.

ITALY.

Railways at VERONA and MESTRE.
Railway yards at MILAN.
A railway bridge at PERUGIA.
Rail yards at MONTE PESCALI.
A bridge and a viaduct at MAGNO.
A bridge at CERTALDO.
A factory near TIVOLI.
Gun positions and motor transport in the battle area.
Bridges near GOSETA.
Harbour installations at CASTIGLIONCELLO.

RUSSIA.

(38 enemy planes destroyed).
Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN Front.

FAR EAST.

A merchant ship at KAIMANA (D. N. Guinea).
Airfields at KAVIENG (N. Ireland).
Airfield and installations at RABAUL (N. Britain).
A bridge in the WEWAK area.
Barracks at VIN YEN (French Indo-China).

BURMA.

Military objectives in the CHIN Hills, CHINDWIN Valley, and N.W. BURMA.
Stores and bases in North BURMA.
A Jap H.Q. at MONNYIN.

29—3—44. (Wednesday).

EUROPE (German occupied).
(89 enemy planes destroyed; 18 Allied planes missing).

DAY :—
The railway centre at BRUNSWICK.
Targets in the PAS DE CALAIS area and other places in Northern FRANCE.

NIGHT :—
Railway targets at VAIRES.
Aero-engine works at LYONS (France).
Objectives in Western GERMANY including those at KIEL.
Railway yards at SOFIA (Capital of Bulgaria).

ITALY.

(23 enemy planes shot down).
Rail centres of MILAN, TURIN and BOLZANO.
A German supply dump near Lake ALBANO.
Targets South of ROME.
Air combats over the battle areas.

RUSSIA.

(74 enemy planes destroyed).
Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN Front.

FAR EAST.

Rail yards at NANKING.
The Naval and air base at TRUK.
The air base at RABAUL.
Jap positions on BOUGAINVILLE Island.
PAKIN Island (near PONAPE).

BURMA.

The Supply area at VICTORIA Lake.
Rail objectives at SHWEBO and MONYWA.
Rivercraft and other objectives in the KALADAN, ARAKAN, CHIN Hills, CHINDWIN Valley and N. W. BURMA.
Gun positions N. E. of KAMAING.

30—3—44. (Thursday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

DAY :—
No information.

NIGHT :—(94 Allied planes missing).
The Industrial centre of NUREMBURG.
Targets in W. GERMANY.
Laying mines in enemy waters.
Railway yards in SOFIA (Capital of Bulgaria).

ITALY.

(21 enemy planes shot down; 12 Allied planes missing).
The airfield at IMOTSKI.
Motor, rail and shipping targets in the ANZIO area.
Shipping and dock installations at LEGHORN.

RUSSIA.

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN Front.

FAR EAST.

PALAU Islands (Carolines).
The airfield at WOLEAI (Carolines).
The airfield at BABO (D. New Guinea).
Airfields at KAVIENG and NAMATANAI (N. Ireland).
Installations at RABAUL (N. Britain).
Targets at HOLLANDIA and WEWAK (both in N. Guinea).
Coastal targets in BOUGAINVILLE (Solomons).

BURMA.

Motor transport, enemy positions and communications in the ARAKAN, KALADAN, CHIN Hills and CHINDWIN Valley areas.
Gun positions near KAMAING.
Rivercraft in South BURMA.
The airfield at ANISAKAN.

31—3—44 (Friday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

DAY :—(1 Allied plane missing).
Offensive patrol over Northern FRANCE.

Night :—
Objectives in Western GERMANY.

ITALY.

Bridges at ROSETO and PEDASO.
Shipping along the DALMATIAN coast.
Offensive patrols over the battle areas.
Communications in the battle areas.

RUSSIA.

(86 enemy planes shot down).
Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN Front.

FAR EAST.

The Jap naval base at TRUK (Carolines).
The airfield at PNFOE (Timor).
Defence areas at RABAUL (N. Britain).
Targets at BOUGAINVILLE (Solomons).

BURMA.

Targets at PINLEBU.
Targets in the ARAKAN, MAYU, KALADAN, CHIN Hills and CHINDWIN Valley areas.

1—4—44 (Saturday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

DAY:—
Industrial targets and communications in South-west GERMANY.
Airfields in BREMEN and HANOVER areas.

NIGHT :—
Targets in HANOVER, KREFELD and AACHEN (all in Germany).
Laying mines in enemy waters.

ITALY and the BALKANS.

Rail yards at BROD (Yugoslavia).
MOSTAR and BIHAC.
Targets at VARESA and MOMBINED.
Rail installations at POGGIBONSI, LEGHORN, ORVIETO and VELDARO.
Targets at LEGHORN.
Dump near MORICONE.
Shipping off the DALMATIAN coast.

RUSSIA.

(40 enemy planes shot down).
Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN Front.

FAR EAST.

The Jap airfield at HOLLANDIA (N. Guinea). (17 Jap planes destroyed).

The airfield at MOEM (Truk) (11 Jap planes shot down).

BURMA.

The Kammendine Ry. station at RANGOON.

Rivercraft stores, dumps and gun positions in ARAKAN and N. W. BURMA areas.

Communications in South and Central BURMA.

ENEMY AIR RAIDS.

26—3—44 (Sunday).

BRITAIN.

No information.

RUSSIA and FAR EAST.

No enemy air activity.

27—3—44 (Monday).

BRITAIN.

(8 Axis planes shot down).

South and South-East WALES in ENGLAND.

RUSSIA and FAR EAST.

No information.

28—3—44 (Tuesday).

BRITAIN.

No enemy air activity.

RUSSIA and FAR EAST.

No information.

29—3—44 (Wednesday).

BRITAIN.

No enemy air activity.

RUSSIA.

No information.

FAR EAST.

Air combats over the ARAKAN area.

30—3—44 (Thursday).

BRITAIN.

A few places in East and South-East ENGLAND.

LONDON area

RUSSIA and FAR EAST.

No information.

31—3—44. (Friday).

BRITAIN.

No enemy air activity.

RUSSIA and FAR EAST.

No information.

1—4—44. (Saturday).

BRITAIN.

No enemy air activity.

RUSSIA.

No information.

FAR EAST.

Allied positions in the IMPHAL area.

2—4—44. (Sunday).

BRITAIN, RUSSIA and FAR EAST.

No information.

SIDE LIGHTS.

WINGATE. Toll for the brave, the brave that are no more. Wingate is dead, BRITAIN'S greatest guerilla leader and jungle fighter. The Moloch of war has claimed him. A brave son of BRITAIN, he died the death of a patriot. He was a great soldier, a great friend of the Burmese—they called him their *First Chindit*, the First Lord Protector of their pagodas. Within a short time he earned their undying gratitude as the guardian not only of their lives but of all they held sacred.

Wingate is dead, killed on March 24, while on a tour of inspection across the jungles of the BURMA frontier behind the Japanese lines. When returning to his station a storm broke out and his plane crashed.

Wingate is dead but with fame, undying, at the age of 39. Scholar and philosopher, original and adventurous, he was the Lawrence of Arabia, of this war. Puritan, he carried his Bible wherever he went, and spoke to his men in the language of the Bible. He quoted Greek classics, and conversed on topics ranging from philosophy and literature, art, music and painting to politics and economics.

It is an injustice to call Wingate a professional soldier though fighting was his business, because in his hands it became a mission. He proved a military genius. He was a planner and experimenter.

To him belongs the honour of the discovery of a new technique-Wingate's 'Circus'-as it was called, air-borne guerilla invasion and jungle fighting in the enemy'sr ear.

It was not a visionary's enterprise. He had tested it already. He had raised guerilla patriot bands earlier in ABYSSINIA to turn out the Italians. With such weapons he had also fought the terrorists in PALESTINE.

It was lucky for him that he came early under Mr. Churchill's notice. The Premier with his rare insight, discovered his talents, took him to the Conference at QUEBEC, where Wingate impressed General Marshall, and finally sent him to INDIA to try out his ideas against the Japanese in BURMA.

Arriving in INDIA, Wingate found that there was a double battle to fight—one against the doubters, the critics, and the traditionalists in the Army, and another against the Japanese. He fought them both simultaneously, simply by plunging into action immediately and winning a brilliant victory. The sceptics who were waiting to scoff were forced to admire, and the Japanese found themselves beaten at their own game.

Who has not heard of his great air-borne expedition with a 'ghost army' into the very heart of BURMA, behind Japanese positions, where, hidden in the jungles, he destroyed the enemy's railways, roads and ammunition dumps, killed the Japanese in large numbers and returned with valuable information.

One of the most thrilling and hazardous expeditions of the war, it brought a rich harvest in results. Following the expedition, a strong British and Gurkha force has now been established near INDAW, 200 miles inside enemy territory. A rail-and-road block, 200 miles long, and an air-post behind the enemy lines have also been secured.

Promoted from Brigadier to Major-General, recipient of the Distinguished Service Order, with a bar to his D. S. O., he also won a niche in the temple of fame. Wingate is dead, but his discovery survives. His spirit still inspires the men whom he led to Victory over the most wily of foes. He leaves behind a name, which we in INDIA may well cherish with gratitude, because in a way, he is our *Chindit* as well, because by continuing his methods of warfare we are now driving out the most dangerous enemy of INDIA from our frontier.

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A WARRIOR'S GRIEF. Lord Louis Mountbatten has issued the following Order of the Day to General Wingate's forces. "General Wingate has been killed in the hour of his triumph. The Allies have lost one of the most forceful and dynamic personalities of the war. You have lost the finest and most inspiring leader a force could have wished for, and I have lost a personal friend and faithful supporter.

He has lit the torch. Together we must grasp it and carry it forward. Out of your gallant and hazardous expedition into the heart of Japanese-held territory, will grow the final reconquest of Burma and the ultimate defeat of the Japanese. He was so proud of you. I know you will live up to his expectations".

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THE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE. Mr. Churchill is an adroit and astute politician as well as a profound statesman. He can inspire and lead, as well as drive and command. Using a trivial incident he has consolidated the national will. The vote of confidence which he won for himself and his party during the week is not merely a personal triumph, a snub to obstructing Shinwellites, but an expression also of the national will to Victory. It is a demonstration that in the prosecution of the war there is neither Conservative nor Labour, but all stand behind the State and the Premier in a single phalanx.

What a lesson in solidarity to INDIA, if she would learn, if this unhappy country would ever learn! With the enemy at her gate she is still talking tweedledum and tweedledee. We are painfully reminded of the story of the man, clinging desperately to a broken reed, half-way down a well, with a snake hissing below, and a tiger growling above but happy to be so lucky as to be able to lick some honey dripping from a honeycomb in a chink in the well-wall.

These sad reflections apart, the occasion for the Vote of Confidence in the British Premier was the Government's defeat, by a single vote, over the question of equalising the pay of women teachers with that of men. The Government did not go into the merits of this question, but asked for time to come to a decision, as a Special Commision was just now investigating the whole question of teachers' salaries. But the Shinwellites would not wait.

The Prime Minister, scenting intransigence in the political rank and file, showed his teeth and put his foot down. With an enemy to be beaten he would not tolerate any shilly-shallying. At this hour there should be but one voice, a single determination, be the matter domestic or be it military. He told the House that *unless* the offending amendment was rescinded he and his Government would resign.

The effect was electrical. Mrs. Cazalet Keir, the very woman Member, who brought forward the proposal, voted against her own amendment, as well as the Labour Party, which had sponsored the equalisation of pay.

Mr. Churchill was pleased, because the Nation had demonstrated that it solidly stood behind him. When the vote of Confidence was passed, he smiled, and the reporter adds, it spread into one broad smile along the whole Government Front bench.

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SAKHALIN. JAPAN has agreed, rather suddenly, to transfer her concessions in Northern SAKHALIN to RUSSIA, and to extend the Fisheries Convention in the SAKHALIN waters for another five years. It means the virtual loss of SAKHALIN coal, oil and fish, that is of food and materials, so necessary to JAPAN in these critical times.

Why this sudden step? Why these concessions just now, after so much postponement and delay in carrying out promises made as early as 1941? The reasons are not far to seek. This sudden exhibition of friendship is due to Russian Victories, as that for the delay in 1941 was due to the German Victories. When the Germans advanced, what was more natural than for the treacherous Japanese to postpone promises, and even to seek to intimidate RUSSIA by massing troops on the Siberian frontier; and what more easy, now that RUSSIA is advancing, than for Janus JAPAN to make a fulsome demonstration of friendship?

The event is instructive in another way. It proves that the war, to use a much belaboured word, is truly global. Zhukov's blows on the Dniester have hit JAPAN in the Pacific waters. To Hitler it is an indication, perhaps for the first time, of the back sliding of his surviving Axis partner; to his satellites, it is a hint that when a major partner of the gang is deserting there is every excuse for smaller fry to follow suit. But the Gestapo!

The Russian newspaper has commented on the event lucidly:—

'Japanese faith in Hitler's mad plans had been undermined by the Red Army Victories, aided by the British and American military operations.

'The faith in the invincibility and strength of the German military machine has been undermined. The certainty of Hitlerite Germany's defeat and bankruptcy has become obvious. Hitler's plans to isolate the Soviet Union fell through.

'The international position of the Soviet Union has become even stronger in the course of the war. A mighty anti-Hitlerite coalition of three great powers has been created and has become stronger.

'The logic of events is stronger than any other logic.

'The Victory of this logic has created favourable conditions for the resumption of Soviet—a Japanese negotiations for the liquidation of the Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin.'

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PROGRESS OF THE WAR. Gen. Manstein's forces have been cut in two. With the capture of VINNISTA, ZHMERINKA and MOGILEV the two halves have been isolated. Consequently, while Manstein continues to command the Northern half, Von Kleist has been despatched to take over the Southern—the weaker of the two.

In the race between the Russian Generals Zhukov and Koniev to reach the Pruth, Zhukov won. Koniev is now within ten miles of Zhukov. Moving towards PRZEMYSL in GALACIA, at the junction of the Carpathian Passes, and with CERNAUTI nearly in his hands, Zhukov now commands two lines of advance—down the Serret Corridor into RUMANIA and the Danubian plains or West, over the Carpathians, into CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.

The Russians are impatient for the time when they will fight GERMANY on foreign territory, using their artillery and aircraft to destructive effort. Hitherto, having to fight on their own soil, they have used these weapons with some restraint.

So far, the Wehrmacht has been fighting to retain if possible a portion of the Russian territory it had taken; hereafter it will have to defend a region vital to GERMANY herself—an area from which she draws her food and oil supplies.

From the Carpathians to the Black Sea the Germans now try to hold—with the help of RUMANIA—a line on which they can make a stand, on the Pruth, on the Serret, or the Danube. To protect the flanks, GERMANY wants Bulgarian assistance.

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IN ITALY the Allies have gone back to the defensive in the CASSINO Sector. Here the Germans have reoccupied Monastery Hill and Hangman's Hill but the Allies have taken Mt. Merrone.

Speaking of CASSINO, Mr. Henry Stimson, the U. S. War Secretary, has commented that the Allied attack on CASSINO has subsided, 'though the final chapter has not yet unfolded.' CASSINO was never a major front, and any set-back here will by no means affect the course of the war.

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IN BURMA as His Excellency the Governor of Madras has reminded us, a great deal of fighting is going on with success to the Allies. The Japanese infiltration into MANIPUR is only in small numbers and without great significance, a mere token invasion made for political purposes, in order to furnish materials for rumour-mongers. On the other hand, the Allied determination to retake BURMA is taking definite shape, and the larger war in the Pacific to defeat JAPAN is

rapidly spreading all over the Pacific. It has already reached JAPAN's inner ring of defences. Her shipping has been reduced, her planes driven out of the skies and her fleet is being challenged. The Japanese activities in the Bay of Bengal may have increased of late, but the Royal and Indian Navies are dealing with any situation that may arise.

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THE PACIFIC SURVEY. The U. S. War Department has issued the following report on the Pacific war :—Approximately, 100,000 Japanese soldiers in the besieged islands of the South and South-West Pacific, are now facing a hopeless future, with the alternative of death at the hands of the Allies or from starvation, and disease. The Japanese in the MARSHALLS, Northern SOLOMONS and the Bismarck sea area are in the grip of a relentless sea and air blockade, coupled with direct assaults against them. With the exception of small amounts of supplies brought in by submarine or barge, no substantial aid has reached the Japanese in these areas in recent weeks. Nine out of every ten Japanese vessels attempting to bring in supplies are destroyed, while 50 per cent of barges attempting to run the blockade at night are sunk. The remaining Japanese are faced with the alternative of standing and giving combat until their ammunition is exhausted, or of fleeing deeper into the jungles to await death by starvation or desease, as their supplies decrease. American infantrymen are beating the Japanese at their own game of jungle fighting, inflicting casualties in the ratio of 30 to 1.

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THE RED CROSS. MADRAS has inaugurated a campaign to collect Rs. 30 lakhs for what is known as the Joint War Organisation of the Red Cross and St. John. The objects of the two organisations are well-known. St. John provides the workers, the first Aiders and the Nurses, and the Red Cross, the materials, for the relief of the sick and the wounded. The despatch of comforts for the prisoners of war is a branch of their activities.

BRITAIN pays for her Red Cross in INDIA. It is only fair that INDIA should pay for hers.

The Indian Red Cross works in different countries. Our men are fighting in the Mediterranean area, they are in PERSIA, and IRAQ, in ADEN and CEYLON, and in the areas where the South-East Asia Command fights. No wonder it costs a good bit. It is going to be Rs. 300 lakhs this year. MADRAS has appealed for Rs. 30 lakhs only, as her share.

Government cannot pay all this money. For one thing Governments move slowly, while the aid is urgent. For small things, like books for the sick and the wounded in the hospitals for a ping-pong ball or a base ball it looks silly to ask Government to pay, while the sufferers are our own kith and kin, even our sons and brothers. INDIA is a land of charity ; here is a humanitarian cause. We pray that the response may be generous.

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CADETS AND QUALIFICATIONS. Referring to a complaint made in the Council of State about the selection and promotion of Indian cadets to the Army, the C-in-C explained that while he would be foremost in his tribute to the bearing of his men in the services he regretted but that he was not getting the right standard of men. He made it plain that he would never accept a situation in which he would be asked to take or advance an officer simply because he was

an Indian. European or Indian, he insisted on qualifications and efficiency, as the lives of hundreds of men who would fight under an officer depended on his efficiency and judgment. With this object in view, the Government have now introduced new methods of selection, including R. A. F. ground tests and flying grading. It was expected that this arrangement would keep out undesirable entrants, and make for economy in the training of the efficient ones.

DEFENCE OF CARPATHIAN LINE.

AIM OF NAZI MEASURES IN HUNGARY.

(From the Manchester Guardian).

It is clear why Germany has proceeded to direct military measures in Hungary. The Reich could not feel secure in defending the new Carpathian line if she were uncertain about Hungary. The question is how far Hungary acquiesces in what is equivalent to occupation by the German troops.

Military quarters in London are inclined to regard the figure of 150,000 for the German occupying force as exaggerated. There is no confirmation of reports that Hungary is offering military opposition to the Germans. It is not certain that its Government and military authorities were minded to do so.

Hungary has not been severely affected by the war. With the exception of Bulgaria, she has contributed fewer soldiers to the German armies than any of Germany's satellites. A good deal of propaganda was made about Hungary's forces fighting against Russia on the eastern front. But it is doubtful if they exceeded two or three divisions in all. Hungary's military strength, therefore, remains intact. It is doubtful, however, whether the Hungarian Army is well equipped with modern weapons.

The Rumanians have suffered infinitely more in the cause of their German allies. This fact, paradoxically enough, tends to strengthen the German grip over both Hungary and Rumania. Rumanians are afraid that Hungary (which has lost so few troops) might take the opportunity to seize the whole of Transylvania, while Rumania (already heavily bled) seeks to defend the eastern frontiers which Russia is beginning to penetrate.

Germany, by occupying Hungary, can reassure Rumania that what she still has of Transylvania is secure under Reich protection. It is true that both Hungary and Rumania would now like to get out of the war. But the Government of neither country is resolute, while the Germans are both resolute and strong. Clearly, the political democracy of the western Allies is not the ideal for which the Hungarian Government or Rumanian dictatorship would oppose the Germans, while both the Governments are hostile to Soviet Russia in every way—ideologically as members of the so-called Anti-comintern Pact and as military contributors to the war against Bolshevism, which is the way the European struggle is presented to their peoples.

HUNGARIANS TOO LATE.

Thus, while both Hungarians and Rumanians have latterly sought ways of getting out of the war, it is, to say the least, doubtful whether either had the resolution to do more than "lie down"—and that is not enough. The Hungarians are now too late. Probably, the Rumanians too are.

The Germans have taken the first dispositions for defending the Carpathian line. They may well succeed in playing off Rumanians against Hungarians for the profit of the Reich. If they do, they will secure their communications and, perhaps, obtain full use of Hungary's army. Certainly, a campaign of non-violence by either Hungary or Rumania will not prevent the Germans from getting their way in South-East Europe.

HISTORY OF HUNGARY'S AGGRESSION.

The mounting tide of tyranny and power in the aggressive German Reich was watched by Hungary with a narrow opportunism. Insted of backing up Balkan attempts at solidarity, she waited her chance to grab her neighbour's land.

When Germany raised her claims against Czechoslovakia for the Sudetenland, Hungary took advantage of the occasion to seize a narrow strip of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia. By the first Vienna Award, November 2, 1938, while the German and Italian representatives did redraw the new frontier line, this first Magyar demand was almost entirely satisfied. In gratitude to the Axis, Hungary signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in February 1939.

Having had one helping, Hungary asked for more. On March 14, 1939, the day before the outrageous German occupation of Prague, she presented an ultimatum to Prague, and by March 18 had occupied the rest of Carpatho-Ruthenia and achieved a common frontier with Poland. She had now acquired a long strip representing the most fertile parts of Slovakia, and all Carpatho-Ruthenia, the command of the railway communications between Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and about half the iron mines to the west of Kosice. To make sure of her stolen gains, she eagerly and openly threw in her lot with the Reich.

Her next victim was Rumania. The Rumanians endeavoured to negotiate; but Hungary broke off negotiations and forced her territorial demands at a moment when it was strategically useful to Germany to have, via Hungary, a long territorial arm reaching into the heart of Rumania, within striking distance of the oilfields. Thus by the Second Vienna Award, August 30, 1940, a large slice of Transylvania was made over to Hungary, and this time she signed the Tripartite Pact in payment, November 1940.

In April, 1941, Hungary entered the war, allowing German troops passage and herself despatching troops against Yugoslavia. But for her territorial thefts from Yugoslavia (Baranja, Backa, Prekurmurjo and Medmurje) Hungary has had to fight, and fight hard.

With the attack on Russia, Germany presented her bill. While progressively tightening the economic screw, she demanded also Hungarian military co-operation on the Eastern front. Hungary dared not refuse, as Germany was her chief protection from the enmity of neighbours embittered by her territorial appetite; but because of her neighbours she also wanted to keep a strong army at home. She has sent only 9 divisions to the Russian front—fewer men than she has employed in trying to cope with partisans of Serbia and Croatia—and has recently withdrawn the remains of the Second Army, leaving only soliders on occupation duties in occupied territory, and none in the front line.

Hungary's old courage has not been conspicuous in this war. Magyars appear to be peculiarly sensitive to air raids, from which they have not suffered comparably with any country of Western Europe. The American raid on the Rumanian oilfields at Ploesti caused something approaching panic in Hungary. *Pester lloyd* (a nominally independent newspaper but used by the Hungarian Government for expositions of foreign policy) has published many pathetic comments on air raids, pleading for immunity for Hungary, scolding the people for rushing the air raid shelters when there was no official warning, and observing—with unusual humility—that

"The coolness and matter-of-fact behaviour of the inhabitants of Western European towns cannot at first be expected of the greenhorns of Budapest."

Realisation that she has backed the wrong horse has had a deflating effect on Hungarian enthusiasm. Friendship with Italy was played up at the time of the fall of Mussolini, without any reaffirmation of loyalty to Germany.

FAILURE OF ANSCHLUSS.

(From The Manchester Guardian).

On the night of March 11, 1938, the newly expanded German Army made its first excursion across the frontier into Austria.

In a matter of days the country was overrun, and the Anschluss became an accomplished fact. Without encountering either national resistance or effectual counter action from abroad, Hitler had won one of his most decisive political and strategical victories of the pre-war period. The map of Europe was changed, but that was not all.

More important to the Germans than their territorial gain was the proof supplied by the absorption of Austria that bloodless conquest was a practical proposition. It convinced them that the methods they had adopted to further the theory of peaceful war would at least enable them to realise the short-term aims of imperialism. The occupation of the Rhineland two years previously was not looked upon as a proper test, but rather as a rehearsal of this policy.

Austria's case was different, and their success appeared to the Germans to provide conclusive evidence that the policy of armed preparedness with the support of a strong minority, judiciously screened by voluble professions of peaceful intent, was sufficient to hoodwink a lethargic world and nullify its schemes for international security.

Austrians themselves soon came to realise that the Anschluss had not been carried out in fulfilment of a sentimental idea, nor merely to give their country, as of right, its place within the new Reich. Hitler's plans for Austria differed substantially from the dreams cherished by Austrian National Socialists and others who had advocated a union with Germany.

German intentions were symbolised in one of the first acts on taking over the country—suppression of its ancient name and its redesignation as Mark.

The Germans lost no time in making the change-over effective. Hard upon the invasion came a stream of bureaucrats from Germany to administer the new province. They are there to-day, at least 40,000 of them, holding every type of civil office from key positions to Mayoralties of quite small towns.

Austrian National Socialists, on the other hand, were posted abroad, at first to jobs in Germany and later to other territories in German occupation. The Austrian Party machine too was overhauled and brought under the control of Germans. Simultaneously, Austria's industries came under the German supervision, while a programme of industrial expansion was set on foot, entirely new enterprises being founded with German capital and under purely German management. The process of Germanisation was thorough and far-reaching.

This wholesale and ruthless usurpation of their independence has had its effect on the Austrian people. Where Dollfuss and Schuschnigg and Austro-Fascism had failed, German National Socialism has succeeded. Austrian reaction to the German rule has become politically manifest in the growth of a vigorous national feeling, which in addition to being profoundly anti-German shows a positive trend in the direction of Democracy based on sovereign independence. Austrians generally have learnt their lesson, and union with Germany, which once found favour even among those having no National Socialist affinities, is more loathed than liked to-day.

The Moscow declaration by great Powers was a new call to life, denouncing the Anschluss and affirming the right of the Austrian nation to be restored to independence. Austria's reorganisation within the free world will one day become a major problem of European security, with effects extending beyond the central zone. The task of ensuring and safeguarding the permanence of Austria's independence will be rendered more formidable by reason of the political and economic alterations that the country has undergone during the period of German domination.

CAN THE LUFTWAFFE BE KNOCKED OUT IN 60 DAYS ?

(*E. Colston Shepherd.*)

We have grown accustomed in Britain to the view that strategic bombing cannot be expected to yield quick results. The opinion attributed to an American spokesman in London that the *Luftwaffe* can be knocked out within 30 to 60 days sounds to British ears like asking a cart-horse to gallop.

Admitting that the scale of heavy bombings has risen and is still rising, and agreeing that the German fighter strength has suffered seriously in air battles, we, who have watched the fruits of persistence, are unwilling to prophesy a swift final victory. Germany has shown a certain skill in stretching her resources. The present optimism concerning the overthrow of her air arm rests on the alternative assumptions that she will present her fighter forces for a decisive series of combats, or that if she refuses combat her aircraft can be destroyed on the ground.

Air forces in Europe are said to have been ordered to overwhelm the *Luftwaffe*, and the best way to do it is to cut off their supply of aircraft and to shoot down those already in the front line. Neither method can be sure of complete success within a given period or in a given theatre of war. Goebbels was boasting the other day of the wide dispersal of the German aircraft industry in occupied countries, and, tainted though that source is, we know that there is an element of truth in his statement. The bombing of factories which make aircraft components, and of shops in which they are assembled, could be expected to have an immediate effect only if the German production had been unable to build up a reserve during the winter.

For the greater part of the year, Germany has profited from the change-over to fighter production. That change was made during the winter of 1942. By mid-summer last, the fighter output was estimated at about 1,000 monthly. It has since risen to 1,500 and there were hopes in the Reich that it would go up to 2,000. That hope began to fall when the big aircraft shops at Wienerneustadt were damaged by the Americans early this year, and when the R. A. F., went for the components works in Liepzig, Munich Augsburg and Oscerslen. There were other attacks on Regensburg, Brunswick and the industrial areas of Berlin.

During the past three months, the German aircraft industry has been hard hit. Certain of its satellites in France have been harshly dealt with, but those parts which were moved into East Prussia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States suffered comparatively little. The remaining flow of aircraft from such sources may not have been quite enough to replace the losses of the past three months, and yet sufficient to allay serious anxiety, particularly in view of the large output of the preceding six months, Germany may quite possibly have built 7,000 or 8,000 fighters during that period. She has not lost one half of them in combat on the western and the southern fronts, and she may be expected still to have units in Western Europe with a front line strength of about 1,500 fighter aircraft.

A force of that size may indeed be inadequate for the defensive work of such magnitude as that which has faced her during February and March. The *Luftwaffe* may well be questing about for new means of making a little go a long way. Some change in the tactical or the strategical plan may explain in part the immunity from opposition enjoyed by the American heavies that went to Berlin and to Munster recently. Whether the *Luftwaffe* intends to try an offensive against Allied air bases, or to save its strength for an attempt to "scotch" the invasion when the second front opens, it is obviously persuaded of the need to take a long view.

The Allies will have to be sure of bringing the *Luftwaffe* to full combat if they are to knock it out in 60 days. The opening of the second front would probably do it, but the prospects of tempting it to destruction without a gambit of that order are small, as we in Britain have found during the past three years.

GERMAN NAVAL C-IN-C IGNORES NAVY.

HEROES' DAY SPEECH.

A. J. McWhinnie.

The decision to put up Admiral Karl Doenitz, German Naval Commander-in-Chief as the principal speaker for Germany's "Heroes Day" could not have been taken lightly Four times in four years' of war Hitler has addressed the German people on the annual day of prayer for Germany's dead.

These were the things that Hitler said:

1940.—I live now for one task alone...........to concentrate on victory, and fight for it, if necessary not to spare my own life.

1941.—England will fall.

1942.—Bolshevists will be annihilatingly defeated by us in the coming summer.

1943.—In the months to come we shall achieve the successes necessary for the final victory.

This year, when the war goes against the Reich on all fronts, Hitler did not speak. Goering who said, "Berlin will never be bombed" could hardly have been produced at a time when the Anglo-American offensive reached a record peak. Military chiefs could hold out no hope, in view of the Russian victories and the imminent approach of the second front. Dr. Goebbels kept clear of the whole affair.

GERMANY'S U-BOAT HOPE.

But Germany still has a hope that U-boats may launch a new campaign yet, and achieve some spectacular triumphs. Hence Admiral Doenitz's appearance in the principal róle on the "Heroes Day".

It is easy analysing the Admiral's "Heroes Day" speech to realise his difficulties. He could not have held out early hopes of decisive victory, But he made a bad psychological blunder in ignoring altogether the war at sea. For more than a quarter of a century—ever since his own U-boat was sunk in the last war—Admiral Doenitz boasted that given U-boats in hundreds he would win the war against Britain. They gave him U-boats in hundreds. U-boats were given priority in men and materials. But all these Doenitz plans and guarantees have gone away. His own words : "Britain can only be beaten at sea" have stuck in German minds, just as Goering's words, "Berlin will never be bombed" are remembered.

As Britain admits the possibility of U-boats being on the eve of another offensive, Admiral Doenitz might reasonably have heartened his listeners with stories of how the tide might be turned. Instead, he found it necessary to call for utmost loyalty to Hitler and the German war leadership, and the greatest unity between the home front and the fighting front. He used vague terms in an effort to show that Russian victories were due to the Soviet having vast supplies of men and materials, but was careful to avoid attracting attention to the fact that the German Navy had failed to stop vast war supplies being carried to Russian ports from Britain.

INTERPRETING ATLANTIC CHARTER.

(*The Times*).

The Atlantic Charter is a subject of vital importance, and rightly continues to exercise public thought and attention.

Renewed discussions during the past few weeks, by no means confined to this country, of the validity and interpretation of the Charter, have shown that two and a half years after its promulgation it still retains its authority, and its appeal as an agreed record of the aims of the United Nations. It never pretended to represent decisions of policy ;

while policy cannot be divorced from principle, international policies cannot be determined, any more than national policies, by a mere enunciation and application of general principles, however loftily conceived; regard must be had both to the relative power of conflicting interests at stake—a factor familiar enough and taken for granted in domestic politics—and to the social and political structure in which the policies are operative.

Two criteria are plainly and indissolubly relevant to territorial settlement after the war. The first is the principle of self-determination, borrowed by the framers of the Charter from the Wilsonian ideology of 25 years ago. The second is the necessity of so framing the settlement as to assure the attainment of those aims of "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" which are implicit in the Charter as a whole. It is common ground that the first of these criteria may on occasions have to yield to the second.

Whatever may have been true in the past centuries, division of Europe to-day into 20 or 30 sovereign and independent units, owing no allegiance to any higher authority, is incompatible with the military security and economic well-being of the European peoples. This is a hard and irrefutable fact. To attempt to override it, on grounds of any general theory of self-determination, would not be to act on a high political principle but political madness.

It is then an essential quality of all political principles that they cannot be applied absolutely and automatically, and this quality attaches to the principles enshrined in the Atlantic Charter. But this does not mean that the principles are invalid. That a Government depends in the last resort on the consent of the governed is a truth far older than the Charter; and the recent reform of the constitution of the Soviet Union may be construed as among other things a reaffirmation of this truth in relation to the constituent Republics of the Union. What, therefore, is required to-day, to bring the Atlantic Charter, so far as the European peoples are concerned, from the realm of general principles into that of practical politics, is elaboration of the policy designed to attain first and foremost, the supreme ambitions of suffering humanity everywhere to-day—"freedom from want" and "freedom from fear".

Attainment of these goals cannot be reconciled with return to pre-war divisions of Europe, even if these were reinforced by contingent obligations of the kind contemplated in the Covenant of the League of Nations. It demands to-day over large areas—nothing but disaster can come from concealing or ignoring this cardinal fact—wide measures of permanent and common military organisation, permanent and common systems of tranport, permanent economic union and common planning. If these things cannot be achieved, the other principles of the Atlantic Charter will be swept away by the irresistible march of events. But, if they are achieved, the task of applying those principles within the essential framework of unity, thus laid down, becomes both possible and urgent.

To abandon altogether the principles of self-determination enshrined in the Charter would be an act of cynicism which would bring its own penalties; to assert them at the expense of the demands of planned military security and economic organisation would still be more disastrous, and most of all to those on whose behalf they are invoked. The right policy is not in doubt. The pessimistic assumption that the peoples of Europe, emerging from more than four years of torment and despair, will set passions of national

ambition and self-assertion over the sober needs of recuperation and reconstruction may indeed be realised; if so, it is not too much to say that Europe and the world may expect another Hitler. But it need not be realised if Europe finds clear and decisive leadership from without or from within. Great Britain would only be fulfilling her responsibilities, at the same time serving her own surest interests, if by her declarations and her actions, she firmly pointed the way towards a sane, ordered and United Europe.

ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION IN POST-WAR WORLD.

STETTINIUS TO EXPLORE BRITISH MIND.

By Edward Montgomery.

Diplomatic quarters in London are looking forward with eager interest to the coming visit of Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, American Under Secretary of State.

It will be the first visit to London of a high ranking official of the U. S. State Department since Mr. Sumner Welles—whom Mr. Stettinius succeeded some months ago—came to Britain in the course of his "fact finding" mission for Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull in the fateful early spring of 1940.

Mr. Richard Law, Mr. Stettinius's "opposite number", so to speak, in the Foreign Office has been twice in the United States since America's entry into the war, and Mr. Eden had an opportunity of meeting Mr. Hull and others at Quebec in the autumn of 1943.

Mr. Stettinius is to bring with him several top-ranking officials in the State Department. This will afford invaluable opportunities for these personal contacts between men working at the same jobs and struggling with similar problems which are the soundest basis for good understanding.

Mr. Stettinius and his staff will come, it is understood, with an informal agenda. The purpose of his visit will undoubtedly be to explore as fully as possible how the mind of the British Government is working on all these aspects of foreign affairs in which Britain and the United States have equal interests.

There is a plethora of subjects for discussion under the general heading, for with recent developments British and American interests are now paralell to each other in virtually every portion of the globe that is touched by the combined Anglo-American sea and air power.

For this is the dominant factor which must in future govern, not only the relations between Britain and the United States themselves, but such policies as they may from time to time concert with each other in their joint dealings with other Powers. When the war is ended, and when both Germany and Japan have been finally and completely defeated, British and American combined sea and air power will exercise unchallenged and unchallengeable supremacy over all open oceans of the world and the air above them.

To say this is not to boast—it is merely to state a political fact, a fact, moreover of the utmost importance for the future of the world. The fact of the Anglo-American sea and air supremacy is not one that can be burked or evaded by either country—or both. Nor can the heavy burdens, obligations and duties imposed by that fact on each of them be resigned or allowed to go by default. Many problems which will in the future individually confront both the British and United States Governments can only be resolved in relation to that fact.

Both Britain and the United States are peace loving nations. It will be the constant concern of the Governments of both countries to use the power given them by that fact, and the opportunities it affords them wisely and with restraint, to promote peace and prosperity throughout the world. They will be fully conscious of the grave responsibilities it lays on them.

But clearly that power cannot be exercised separately. It must be a joint affair, with both countries moving forward together on progressive policies jointly conceived and jointly executed. To do this will require the closest possible collaboration between the various departments of the two Governments concerned.

"GREMLIN" FACTORY.

A Japanese soldier's usefulness to the Emperor is not ended when he is killed. According to the nationalistic Nipponese religious teachings, soldiers slain in battle become minor deities and go right on fighting the enemy in gremlinesque fashion. They foul up his radio equipment, make his detachments fire at each other, worry and scare his troops to the point of suicide.

This kind of spiritual guerilla warfare has been solemnly credited with helping last summer's Jap evacuation of Kiska, in the Aleutians, after U. S. forces had mopped up the garrison on neighbouring Attu. A copy of the Government owned *Japan Times and Advertiser* cited four "miraculous" incidents:

On July 26, Jap radio detector instruments on Kiska picked up "two masses of steel" approaching from east and west. In the thick northern fog a terrific cannonading broke out, then the masses of steel moved away. Later, a Jap evacuation fleet entered the habour unscathed. "Thus the soldiers from Kiska believe that the souls of the deified heroes of Attu had lured the enemy over the sea and made them fight each other by tampering with their wireless instruments."

For the evacuation, "the guardian deities of Attu" also calmed the seas, and temporarily hoisted the fog to provide a convenient 15 feet of perfect visibility.

As the departing force passed south of Attu, some of the men suddenly saw the heroes of Attu comming out to give them a send-off, waving Rising Sun flags from small boats. Others heard a distant roar of "Banzai!"

Even though Kiska was cleaned out to the last carrier pigeon, "foreign reports" indicated that the occupying Americans had to fight bitterly for three weeks against a spirit army which moved in from Attu. In the South Pacific, too, Japanese spirits "have tangled with the enemy, causing many of them mental derangements and others to kill themselves as a result of nervous breakdown and morbid fear."

Only malevolent Jap spirit yet reported by U. S. Marines in the Pacific Theatre: captured *sake*!

JAPAN MAY LOSE THE WAR IN A DAY.

(*From the Times Naval Correspondent*).

Since it is only at sea that Japan, like this country, can really be defeated, the Japanese battle fleet can lose the war in a day, and it would seem that the truth has been fully grasped in Japan also, for the various American task forces that have been operating against Japan's outlaying positions—the Marshalls, the Carolines, the Mariannes and the seas between the Bismarck Archipelago and Japan—have all remarked on the non-appearance of the Japanese men-of-war.

Admiral Nimitz expressed the disappointment of the force under Admiral Spruance at finding no Japanese squadron at Truk; Admiral Merrill, who commanded the task force which recently swept a part of the Southern Pacific for three days on end in search of Japanese forces, and sighted nothing but one Japanese aeroplane, is reported as saying that it looked as if the enemy had abandoned his forces in the South Pacific. That indeed is the inevitable conclusion from the recent experience, and it seems clear that the Japanese command has made a fatal miscalculation of its powers—possible through expecting a collapse of its enemies when confronted with Japan's initial successes.

The point appears to have been reached where Japanese forces are overstretched, and the Japanese fleet, weakened by the heavy losses of cruisers and destroyers, can no longer hope to defend its more distant possessions, and is reserving itself for action nearer home. But just as the Allies must aim at the command of even the home waters of Japan, so the Japanese fleet must sooner or later challenge their advance. The Allies will ask for nothing better.

GUERILLA WARFARE IN SOLOMONS.
GROWING ALLIED STRENGTH IN SOUTH PACIFIC.

(*From the Daily Telegraph*)

Col. Owen Noel, British Resident Commissioner in the Solomon Islands, from which the last Japanese are now being cleared, told me of the remarkably successful guerilla warfare carried on by Englishmen, Australians and New Zealanders who had refused to leave when the Japanese invaded the islands. He gave me many examples of how his

Australian and New Zealand officers worked with the local inhabitants in the jungle behind the Japanese lines, how they disrupted Japanese communications and upset the enemy's plans by sending false information.

Col. Noel's home is in Oxford, and he has been 18 years in the Colonial Service.

"Our boys fought when the Japanese came (in January 1942) and they are still fighting," he added.

The wholesale evacuation of 1,150 local people from the Green Islands was achieved by Colonel Noel with Australian officers on his staff and the American Navy. Realising that the position of the local inhabitants might be endangered by Japanese air raids, Allied leaders worked out plans for removal when New Zealanders landed on the islands. The American Navy provided the ships and supplies, and Colonel Noel allocated five villages on Guadalcanal to the refugees.

"The Japanese are licked," high-ranking American naval officers in the Solomons told me. "They cannot stop us now." The Allied naval strength I saw gave ample justification for the confidence and enthusiasm of our leaders in the Pacific. The wealth of material at rear bases and advanced areas is more than adequate to support any forward move. This accumulated and growing strength is paralleled in the South-West Pacific. Allied strength has increased substantially in the South Pacific in the last 12 months. First class facilities have been established for repairing warships and handling and distributing war materials.

Rabaul, the New Guinea base, which is under daily attack by bombers and fighters and periodical naval bombardment, is now finished as an integral part of the Japanese defence system. Nowhere is closeness of Allied co-operation demonstrated more forcibly than in the South Pacific. While the U. S. Navy and Air Force Marines have done the bulk of the work, New Zealand troops cleaned up Vella Lavella and took the Treasury Islands and occupied the Green Islands.

AIR INVASION OF BURMA.

HIGHLIGHTS OF OPERATIONS.

(*Wing Commander L. V. Fraser*).

The achievement of Royal Air Force and United States Army Air Force transport aircraft in landing thousands of armed men and equipment, together with hundreds of pack mules, on narrow single strips laid in the heart of Japanese-held Burmese jungle, to co-operate with General Stilwell's Hukawng Valley forces, and American and Chinese troops opposing the 18th Japanese division, is an operation, unequalled in any previous Allied campaign.

R. A. F. aircraft formed the larger part of the transport force which was under American command of General Old, who successfully landed the first Dakota 12 hours

after the initial landing strip was laid. He was followed afterwards by Air Marshal Baldwin.

The limiting factor of jungle warfare has always been dependent on lines of communication. At best, they have never been very good—just rough roads quite unsuitable for heavy traffic. More often tracks have had to be cut through virgin jungle.

The size of the present operation demonstrates that a strong force of troops cannot only be made independent of ground communication, but can be established and maintained in the wildest and most difficult tracts of enemy territory.

Never before has air transportation of fighting men and equipment reached a similar proportion, nor has an infiltrating force been dropped so far behind the enemy's lines.

LANDING GROUND IN 12 HOURS.

The story behind this operation as one of careful planning and skill in execution. The men were not dropped at random over hostile jungle territory, but landed on a narrow strip of airfield literally torn out of tropical forest. British and American troops made this possible by levelling out within 12 hours of their arrival a landing ground for the transport of aircraft.

By dusk on the first day after the arrival of advance ground parties (whose job it was to make the clearing serviceable), operations had begun in earnest. American glider pilots showed great skill in making these initial landings by moonlight. When a strip had been made serviceable for the transport of aircraft, other difficulties were encountered. Great clouds of dust were thrown up by aircraft taking off, obscuring vision and making the air unbearably gritty. This trouble was largely eliminated by having the aircraft land and take off on parallel courses in opposite directions to set intervals.

RAIDING JAP AIRFIELDS.

Even under these improvised conditions, Allied air superiority over the Japanese was soon demonstrated by the highly successful raid on a neighbouring enemy airfield. In the afternoon of March 8, Shwebe and other enemy-held airfields were raided by Mustangs pilots, who discovered and reported considerable Jap air activity, indicating the arrival of fresh units in that area. As a result, many enemy aircraft were strafed on their landing ground, while one formation of Jap fighters was "jumped" in the air as it came in to land.

Then, just before nightfall, a mixed force of Mitchells, Mustangs and Royal Air Force. Hurricanes carried out a very damaging attack, in which many more Jap aircraft were shot up while in their pens on the ground.

What can be termed air invasion of Burma has begun well, despite all natural difficulties. Allied air forces may be expected to profit from the experience gained by repetition of these tactics.

PLANNING OPERATIONS FROM BURMA TO AUSTRALIA.

SPHERES OF DIFFERENT COMMANDS.

(*From the Economist*).

Fighting in the Pacific zone and fighting in Burma are under two separate commands. In Burma, Lord Louis Mountbatten is Commander-in-Chief both in Arakan and North Burma, with General Stilwell as Commander-in-Chief of the American forces in China, and Chief of Staff to General Chiang-Kai Shek, as Deputy Supreme Cammander.

In the Pacific, Admiral Nimitz is Commander-in-Chief, but General Mac Arthur's sphere must to some extent overlap with his along the outer island ring of Australia's defences. The only obvious link between the strategies of the two supreme Commanders is that they are fighting the same enemy. It is relevant to ask whether their separate approaches do in fact add up to a single strategy.

Lord Louis has not given any public expression to his general plan of action. General Mac Arthur has confined himself recently to scepticism about " island hopping ". Admiral Nimitz and General Stilwell have both given a clearer idea of their strategic plans, and whether or not the two Commanders are working on them together the two plans can be made to fit.

Admiral Nimitz's intention seems to be to drive on from the island bases in the Marshalls and the Carolines, and possibly in some of the Dutch East Indies, to an amphibious attack on the Philippines. From there he would develop a new offensive to the coasts of South China, recapture Canton and establish a big land base for a great assault on Japan.

General Stilwell does not quarrel with the scheme, but he points out that a naval landing would be out of the question, unless there were already a strong land and air support from China itself. If there is difference of opinion about this conception of combined operation against Kwangtung, it is as to priorities and timing. General Stilwell says that first an effort must be made to re-open the road to China and flood it with aircraft and transport. Would this compete with naval priorities for amphibious operations in the Philippines and elsewhere ?

With the defeat of Germany the tightness of supply will presumably be relaxed. Nevertheless the question of priorities will remain, and it is perhaps unfortunate, despite the great distances that separate the theatres, that no Commander in the Pacific has the overall authority of General Eisenhower and his staff to ensure that military necessity alone decides the allocation of resources and the direction of attack. On the other hand, even in Europe there is no connection in the Command or in the day-to-day planning between the eastern and western fronts ; this is done by periodic conferences. If there are anomalies in the counter-offensives against Japan the causes and cure must be looked for in Washington, where Chiefs of Staffs do at least plan the whole of the operations from Burma to Australia and the Mid-Pacific.

Members of the public are requested to make a free present of any suitable old Tamil books they can spare for the perusal, in their leisure time, of our soldiers outside India.

Books so given will be handed over to the Superintendent of the State Press, who will arrange to despatch them.

PUDUKKOTTAI STATE NATIONAL WAR FRONT BUREAU.

PROGRAMME.

LECTURE CXCII. (*Batch 2*).

8- 4-44	Nartamalai	... 7.00 p.m.
9- 4-44	"	... 7.00 "
10- 4-44	"	... 7.00 "
11- 4-44	Vengalur	... 7.00 "
"	Konapattu	... 7.30 "
12- 4-44	Panayapatti	... 7.00 p.m.
"	Rangiyam	... 7.30 "
13- 4-44	Kalamavur	... 7.00 "
"	Nallur	... 7.30 "
14- 4-44	Kudumiyamalai	... 7.00 "
"	Parambur	... 7.30 "

LECTURE CXCIII. (*Batch 3*).

15- 4-44	Municipal Office	... 6.00 p.m.
16- 4-44	Surakkadu	... 7.00 "
"	Kottaikkadu	... 7.30 "
17- 4-44	Tennatirayanpatti	... 7.00 "
"	Visalur	... 7.30 "
18- 4-44	Malaiyur	... 7.00 "
"	Karambakkudi	... 7.30 "
19- 4-44	Ramachandrapuram	... 7.00 p.m.
"	Rayavaram	... 7.30 "
20- 4-44	Valaramanikkam.	... 7.00 "
"	Embal	... 7.30 "
21- 4-44	Viralimalai	... 7.00 "
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12— 4—44	Karambakkudi
13— 4—44	Kilanilai.
14— 4—44	Pudukkottai.
15— 4—44	Ponnamaravathi.
16— 4—44	Tittanviduthi.
18— 4—44	Ramachandrapuram.
19— 4—44	Rayavaram.
20— 4—44	Alangudi.
21— 4—44	Pudukkottai.

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